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Owen Irvine, and Jerome Rothenberg
INTRODUCTION
Inthis chapter we report on work-in-progress of a research
project designed to model the growth and internal compo-
sition of the Boston metropolitan area, and the location of
household and business activities there. The overall model is an
interlocking system of three submodels:(1) a "macro" model,
determining the level and composition of economic activities in the
area;(2) a household allocation model, determining the spatial
distribution of the household population and housing unit supply
over the area; (3) a business allocation model, determining the spatial
distribution of business activity over the area.
This model was designed for use in policy analysis. Changes in the
many policy variables in the model will lead to redistributions of
economic activity within the metropolitan area and changes in
growth patterns of the region. Comparison of alternative scenarios
provides the information upon which policy judgments can be made.
In order to satisfy this objective, it is important to formulate a
behavioral model that incorporates a rich choice of meaningful
policy alternatives.
Each of the three submodels incorporates its own set of policy
Note: This work hasbeensupported by National Science Foundation Grant
GS37O1OX, andpreviouslyby funds from the Ford Foundation. The authors
express thanks to their colleagues on the project, John Harris, William Wheaton,
and Frank Fisher for helpful suggestions at various stages of the research and to
many previous graduate students who assisted in preliminary phases. -
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issues,which can be examined in isolation. In this study we present agents desireti
preliminary results only for the housing location submodel, but models have b
results from other submodels are described in Engle (1974a, 1974b, Ingram, Kain, C
1974c) and Engle et al. (1972). Because this is only a first stage in model econorn(
our efforts to formulate and estimate the complex relationships adjustment, sup
determining household location, we do not focus on the policy the system for
implications of our estimates. Instead, we report the present findings 1974; Harris, N
to give an indication of the promise that our special approach seems assumptions Ufl(
tohold and to suggest how policy variables will influence the spatial for demand beh
character of the metropolitan area, some unattract
The formulation of our behavioral model is based on three included.
propositions about special characteristics of urban housing markets. Our
1. Urban housing is an extremely durable good that is spatially econometrically
fixed. Therefore, the distribution of accommodations at a point in appropriate anc
time will extend its influence into a distant future, and public policy economic
can only gradually affect the spatial distribution of the stock of parameters of
housing. A corollary to this proposition is that supply responses take adjustment
two distinct forms:construction of new units and conversion the latter do no
(comprising physical modification, retirement, and demolition) of our preliminary
existing ones. Since conversion responses can occur at any time, and We model a
since they influence the profitability or desirability of the units, they Our critical foc
are likely to be decided upon by owners on a continuing basis, chief dimension
Substantial modifications are therefore possible to the entire housing accommodation
stock, making this conversion mode of supply response potentially zones: Boston
very important in describing neighborhood evolution. Authority distri
2. Housing is a package of elements, comprising not only struc- towns.
tural features, but also land, neighborhood local The location
public services, and accessibility to desirable destinations within and components of
outside the urban area. Decisions by economic agents, whether dimensions of a
owners, landlords, neighbors, developers, or local government, only available, the p
affect components of the overall housing package. character of tF
3. Differences within each type of component and among compo- facilities, the
nents matter significantly to households, and households differ in (parks, schools,
their tastes for various configurations of these components. Changes the accessibility
in the attributes of the housing package wifi therefore differ in their For suppliers ti




Many approaches have been used to model metropolitan household sion, on the oth
location. Early models based on gravity concepts of attraction The selectior
between economic units proved unable to characterize the important important. We
behavioral balance between attraction and increasing costs as more jurisdiction bot]Simultaneous Estimation of the Supply and Demand 53
agentsdesire the same location. More recently, large simulation
models have been formulated (de Leeuw, Struyk, Marshall 1973;
Ingram, Kain, Ginn 1972), which estimate some parameters of the
model econometrically and then impose rather arbitrary market
adjustment, supply response, or locational choice algorithms to close
the system for simulation. Somewhat simpler models (Wheaton
1974; Harris, Nathanson, Rosenberg 1966), based on the equilibrium
assumptions underlying the bid rent model, estimate closed systems
for demand behavior but do not integrate this with supply and have
some unattractive features; for example, vacancy rates are not
included.
Our approach is to formulate a model that can be estimated
econometrically from observed aggregate data. The model is based on
appropriate and often testable behavioral assumptions concerning
economic agents. In order to gain the luxury of estimates of all the
parameters of demand functions, supply responses, and market
adjustment functions, some simplifications must be made. We feel
the latter do not impair the validity of the approach, and we present
our preliminary estimates as evidence of its promise.
We model a demand for housing accommodation and its supply.
Our critical focus is on the spatial distribution of housing; so the
chief dimension of both demand and supply is the location of each
accommodation. We divided the Boston metropolitan area into 89
zones: Boston itselfisdivided into 14 Boston Redevelopment
Authority districts, and to this we added 75 surrounding cities and
towns.
The location of any particular accommodation specifies many
components of the housing package. For demanders the important
dimensions of a location include the average types of structural units
available, the physical environment of the zone, the demographic
character of the neighborhood, the character of local shopping
facilities, the variety, quality, and cost of available public services
(parks, schools, health and sanitation services, streets, tax rates), and
the accessibility to desirable destinations in ,therest of the SMSA.
For suppliers the location suggests prospects for revenues and costs
associated with the provision of additional units of different types,
since each location is characterized at a given time by specific prices
and vacancy rates, on the one hand, and vacant land availability,
zoning constraints, sewer systems, and stocks available, for conver-
sion, on the other.
The selection of political jurisdictions to represent locations is
important. We aggregate to, but not beyond, the level of the political
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thepublic service-tax component of the locational dimension is
especially important to both the demand and supply sides. In
addition, code and zoning regulations stem from the local govern-
ments and constitutesignificant constraints on housing supply
options. The descriptive and theoretical literature suggests that fiscal
federalism operates by self-selection of common-minded land users
and their control of government instruments to cater to their
common interests while excluding disparate groups. This self-selec-
tion process should impart a greater degree of homogeneity to
land-use patterns within each political jurisdiction than would be
expected on the basis of nonpolitical factors alone. Thus, the
jurisdiction may furnish a tolerable degree of situational homo-
geneity to serve as the observational unit. Clearly, large cities and
towns will be less homogeneous, and our segmentation of Boston is a
recognition of this.
The demand for housing over zones is traced in terms of occu-
pancy by low-, middle-, and high-income-family households. These
three categories of demand serve to allocate the urban population
over space in a partition that is not only interesting in itself because
of its relevance to many socioeconOmic problems and public policy
issues, but is in a form that can be determined within our macro
submodel. That submodel determines a household income distribu-
tion for the metropolitan area as a whole and thus provides a direct
input into our household allocation submodel.
The three household groups are seen as competitors for the scarce
resource of housing accommodations. Presumably all groups would
prefer to locate in attractive zones with good public services and high
accessibility. However, because of the heavy competition for the
limited number of accommodations in such zones, prices of units
there tend to rise high enough to restrict demand to be no greater
than the number of units available (while allowing for a vacancy rate
that reflects normal turnover of households among units). The
aggregate demand curve is the sum of the different household-group
demand curves.
If the price in a zone rises to ration relatively heavy demand, there
will be incentives to suppliers to produce new units there either by
new construction or by conversion of old units to new functions.
The supply response is articulated both by mode—conversion or new
construction—and by structural type—single-family units, units in
multiunit structures (two to four units per structure), and units in
apartment structures (more than five per structure). This breakdown
is useful because new-construction technology differs along these
lines, and the relative ease or difficulty of structural conversion of
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Thegeographic partition of demand and supply in effect treats the
market for housing accommodations in each zone as a separate
housing submarket. Various households demand units based in part
upon the structural characteristics of the zone's average housing
package and in part on a host of other zonal attributes, and the
suppliers produce different quantities of units of differing structural
types depending on the revenues and costs of supply in that zone
both in absolute terms and relative to others. The difference between
aggregate demand and aggregate supply for accommodations in a
zone is the number of vacant units.
Each zone "clears" its housing market by a combination of price
adjustment and quantity adjustment. We employ a vacancy rate to
supplement priáe as a reflection of the market's current state. In a
market characterized by durability, moving costs, and lumpy con-
sumption (one unit per household), price does not adjust rapidly
enough or far enough to clear the market in a reasonably short time.
The market's immediate and moderate-term responses to excess
demand are registered partly by movements in the vacancy rate. For
example, in a tight market, prices may not rise far enough to choke
off sufficient demand to clear the market (inclusive of a "normal"
vacancy rate), so vacancy rate falls below the normal level. Alterna-
tively, in periods of slack demand prices may not fall far enough to
clear the market; then vacancy rates will rise above normal levels.
Vacancy rates supplement prices in influencing the behavior of
demandérs and suppliers. The higher the vacancy rate in a zone, the
less search is necessary for a demander to find a suitable unit. High
search costs discourage demand as do high zonal prices. For suppliers
vacancy rates play two roles in defining expected revenues from
additional units in different zones. First, the figure obtained by
subtracting the vacancy rate from unity reflects the probability that
an additional unit in the zone will be sold or rented; second, the rate
points to future adjustments of price within that zonal market.
HOUSINGDEMAND
Theoretical Foundations
Weperceive the household choice to be the selection of a housing
package designated by its zonal location. The package consists of a
vector of housing structure and land characteristics, social environ-
mental components, public-sector characteristics of the zone, and
potential' accessibility from the zone to other desirable destinations
in tne SMSA. It is important to note that households do not deal











































56 Residential Location and Housing Choice
Thestructural and land characteristics of a zone's housing package and an index.
are described in terms of average or representative units. Variables results).
such as the percent of the units in a zone that are large, old, with This vector
luxury plumbing, or in apartment buildings describe the distribution sector, and ac
of units.Similarly, the population density suggests the typical package. Hous
amount of land input per unit. These summary measures of course the nature of t
fail to capture the entire distribution of actual occupancies; for as well on the
example, small houses exist in neighborhoods that have mostly large determines the
units, leading to some demand in a zone by household types that tions and the
prefer small units. Although these observations should average out commodities.
for large groups of individuals, they may of course be responsible for different
some noise in the estimates. However, in general, it will be true, for suitable unit.
example, that high-income families will demand accommodation in packages is
arelatively high proportion of luxury units, attractiveness,
because the zonal average indicates both their probable own accom- household. Th
modation choice and the probable character of their neighbors. depends partly
A second class of components refers to the social environment of
( attractivenessi
the zone,i.e.,the nature of the residents and of their zonal
. Incomeleve
occupancy. We characterize the former by the percent of the zonal prime interest
population that is nonwhite and the percent on welfare; the latter, demand functi
by the residential population density (population per acre). Another each SMSA fa
variable, the crime rate, refers partly to the social environment and a separate zoi
partly to local public-sector activity, income classe
The third class of components, local public-sector activity, is family housel
reflected by the pupil-teacher ratio in the school systems and the
. attributesand
effective real estate tax rate. It is through variables such as these that to predict the
local public policy has its primary effect on the demand for housing. reside in that 7
The fourth class of components of the housing package refers to Price has a
accessibility. We define accessibility of a zone to be inversely related prices differ
to the anticipated real cost of travel by residents of that zone. For location of th
each zone the expected real cost to a destination depends upon the simple correla
location of the latter and the nature of the transportation network. and zonal attr
Different household types have different destinations and different dilapidated hc
modal choices. The measurement of accessibility is complicated by result. It
the facts that the identity of each zone's inhabitants is not deter- solved—and tl
mined until afterthelocational choice has been made and that some competition
systematic forms of self-selection occur. So the pattern and real cost groups get wh
of trips is a probabilistic matter. Accordingly, in order to capture have already
some sense of this complexity we have constructed a number of In our strw
accessibility indexes: a general job accessibility index by income class costs, and thi
in which destinations and their probable importance in measures of which income
the relative frequency of trips, distance, and economic cost per trip on zonal attn
are integrated in weighted form; an index of highway availability; groupSimultaneous Estimation of the Supply and Demand 57
andan index of transit availability (not shown in the present
results).
This vector of average structural, social environmental, public-
sector, and accessibility components constitutes the zonal housing
package. Housing choices are influenced, but not exclusively so, by
the nature of the package available in each zone. The choices depend
as well on the income level of the household which simultaneously
determines the preferences for different housing package configura-
tions and the desirable tradeoffs between housing and nonhousing
commodities. Finally, the choices depend on the prices of the
different housing packages available, including the cost of finding a
suitable unit. In summary, an array of different zonal housing
packages is available to any household. The packages differ in their
attractiveness, which depends partly on the income class of the
household. They differ also in prices, the sensitivity to which also
depends partly on income class. The household balances off relative
attractiveness with relative price and selects the best compromise.
Income level is handled in our model in a way that illuminates our
prime interest in the spatial distribution of the population. Each
demand function is formulated as the determination of the share of
each SMSA family income class that is located in each zone. We have
a separate zonal location demand function for each of the three
income classes—high, middle, and low—into which we partition
family households. An observation involves use of the set of
attributes and relative prices of a given zone as explanatory variables
to predict the percent of each SMSA family income class that will
reside in that zone.
Price has a special role to play in this formulation. Only because
prices differ from one zone to another can we understand the
location of the low-income families in the most unattractive zones. A
simple correlation between the location of low-income households
and zonal attributes would suggest that low-income households love
dilapidated housing. This conclusion is however a "reduced form"
result. It indicates that once the demand and supply equations are
solved—and that is what takes place in the real world process of
competitionforscarceattractive housing packages—low-income
groups get what is left over because groups with more market power
have already taken their pick.
In our structural model, the tradeoff between price, zonal search
costs, and the attributes of the zonal housing package determine
which income group finally locates in a particular zone. Coefficients
on zonal attributes for the different household groups reflect relative


































ts is not deter-
and that some
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relative willingness to exchange money for preferred housing accom-
modations. Itis these differences in the pattern of coefficients
among income classes which lead to that critical characteristic of
U.S. metropolitan areas, the sharp socioeconomic segmentation of
residential neighborhoods and even political jurisdictions.
The specification. of. the demand for housing determines the
number of occupants as a function of market price and vacancy rate
as well as attributes, as in many conventional Wairasian demand
functions. The attributes serve essentially to define the commodity
and its quality, and the vacancy rate serves as an aspect of the real
price of the commodity to the user.
To make clear the connection between our approach and a variety
of others, which we shall characterize as perfect market models, let
us denote the bid by group i for housing in a particular zone] as
This bid may differ from the market price. It will depend on the
attributes, X, of the zone through an implicit bid rent function
specific to the particular group:
PJ (3-1)
This formulation makes it possible for different user groups to
evaluate the same attributes differently according to their own utility
functions and budget constraints.
Since each user will buy one and only one location, unlike the
conventional demand theory with multiple commodities, that single
locational choice will be based on the competitive bidding of the
different users for the finite set of locations—the existing set of
accommodations available in the several zones at any time.
Ina perfect market the highest-bidding group will win the
accommodations in each zone, and the winning bid will become the
zone's market price. If the actual number of accommodations in the
zone exceeds the number wanted by .the highest-bidding group, the
remainder will go to the group offering the next highest bid, and the
market price will be that lower price of the group o,f second highest
bidders that actually occupies some of the zone's accommodations.
If the actual number of units falls short of the number desired by the
highest-bidding group, the excess .ofusers will settle in other zones
where they are either highest or second highest in zones that have
excess accommodation. Shortages in the first zone will force the
group to raise its whole set of bid prices in its competition to allocate
first and second choices among its members. Each set of bid prices
implies a different utility level for the group: the higher the bid, the
lower the utility. All users are allocated to one zone or another in
this way. In any zone where they reside the zone's market price will
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Fromthe above, the market price in a zone (supposing all
accommodations to be homogeneous) depends on the number of
accommodations available relative to demands for them. The former
depends on past and near-present supply decisions. A zone that
would have been the first choice of a given group if it had had
enough units available to keep the price down, may drop to second
or lower choice if it has a smaller number of units permitting the
price to be considerably higher.
Thus, the demand function for a given group i can be given as a
function of both the group's bid and the zone's market price:
Number of occupants in zonej from group i = (3-2)
Then P3 =PJfor the occupying group in each zone. For that same
group Ph >in every other zone. Thus, a perfect market would
imply that function f(inEquation (3-2)) should be a step function:
for P1 =P,the whole group locates in j;forP3>no member of
the group locates there.2 In a perfect market, the long-run supply
response to different zones equalizes rates of return to suppliers,
setting relative numbers of units that influence household choices.
Under certain conditions (as when additional housing packages,
which include density and other nonstructural zonal attributes, can
be supplied at constant costs) each zone will be homogeneous with
respect to users.
Our treatment diverges somewhat from this procedure. First, in
our model, supply is taken as jointly determined with prices and
demand, but we do not assume that our observations reflect long-run
supply equilibrium. Relative numbers of units available in the
different zones do not establish perfect user homogeneity. Thus, for
any zone, competition results in P3P for user groups. Second, we
do not assume that all users are in their long-run equilibrium. The
high cost of changing occupancy prevents users from being in perfect
adjustment to relative prices in the different zones at every moment.
Third, we introduce vacancy rates as a market adjustment variable.
At any time a market-clearing identity is fulfilled:
Number of units available in zone j=(number of households
of group 1) +vacantunits (3-3)
As noted earlier, we assume that price does not adjust rapidly to
market changes; so vacancy rates represent a residual adjustment and,
together with price, act therefore as a pair of indicators of the
current state of the market; furthermore, they reflect the cost of
search for appropriate housing units in a zone and so are a genuine
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Finally,our model deals with accommodations that are not zonal price; az
uniform in each zone, but are varied. Members of different groups which is a
can find different kinds of accommodation in the same zone. SMSA means.
For all these reasons we estimate each group's demand function as changes, the m
a continuous function of market price, vacancy rate, and implicit bid linear form w
price, i.e., the g' function of zonal attributes is squares (TSLS)
Number of occupants in zone jfromgroup i =f*(P1, (3.4) because of the
=f* [P1.yR1. attributes,
in the percent i
Empirical Results householdson
The demand by a particular household group for housing in a ous.
particular zone depends upon the zonal housing package attnbutes, The
the cost of the search necessary to find a suitable unit in the zone, income family
and the price level prevailing there. It also depends, however, upon variables defin
the prices, search costs, and attributes of other zones that are close I consist'
substitutes for the given zone. In general, the demand in any zone standard errors
must depend upon all the prices, costs of search, and housing each equation.
package attributes in all other zones. Unfortunately, the strength of These prelim
the cross elasticities varies endogenously. As a simple first solution, tency with the
the price, search costs, and attributes of each zone were taken signs of the co
relative to the SMSA average for each variable.3 the cases,
The price variable is designed to be the price per unit of a standard tions rejected
accommodation in a zone. Using actual sales data, price indexes for The coefficieni
each zone were constructed by a regression method described in Table 3-1 meai
Bailey, Muth, Nourse (1963) and illustrated with the same data in of the attribul
Engle (1977). This method eliminates the need to identify the group would in
standard unit, but hinges on the assumption that different types of All threee:
units in a zone experience similar rates of price change. Tests of this are n
hypothesis were generally accepted. Because this price series is an priori. The st
index, it is only possible to determine the rates of change of prices in making the coi
different zones. The model is therefore estimated in rate-of-change low-income
form.4 housing packag
The model as described above can be formalized by a series of reasonable, cor
demand functions for each family income group: in poverty. An
— — — — — isthatmanyi
= Ps/P, V5/V) (3-5) ownersrather
investment as i
whereD" is the number of households of income y who demand unit in a zon
locationzone z,andD represents the SMSA average. A1, A2, A3, capturing futux
A4 are the vectorscomponents of the zonal housing package Each zonal
corresponding to structural and land attributes, social environment, both price and
public service tax, and accessibility, as described earlier;is the zonal demands
.1T
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zonalprice; and the initial zonal housing unit vacancy rate,
which is a measure of search costs; and A1, A2, ...,Vare the
SMSA means. Because the available price variable is an index of price
changes, the model was estimated in terms of decadal differences. A
linear form was chosen as a trial specification. Two-stage least
squares (TSLS) was used to estimate the coefficients of the equations
because of the simultaneous nature of a number of the right-hand
variables. The change in price, the change inall the structural
attributes, the change in population density the change
in the percent nonwhite and the change in the percent of
households on welfareWELFARE),were all treated as endogen-
ous.
The estimated coefficients for the LOW-, MIDDLE-, and HIGH-
income family household groups are shown in Table 3-1, with all the
variables defined in detail in Appendix 3A. As noted earlier, the
consists of the 89 zones of the Boston SMSA. Asymptotic
standard errors and other diagnostic information are presented for
each equation.
These preliminary results display an encouraging degree of consis-
tency with theoretical expectations. The a priori expectations for the
signs of the coefficients are displayed in Table 3-1. In 80 percent of
the cases, these are satisfied and in only two cases are the expecta-
tions rejected at the 95 percent level for a one-tailed asymptotic test.
The coefficients themselves are elasticities: a coefficient of 0.5 in
Table 3-1 means that if the zone were to increase its relative supply
of the attribute by 1.0 percent, the zone's share of that income
group would increase by 0.5 percent.
All three estimated coefficients in the price change variable,
are negative—as economic theoEy would lead us to believe a
priori. The standard errors of this variable, however, are large,
making the confidence intervals wide. It is interesting to note that
low-income families are much more sensitive to the price of the
housing package than either of the two other income groups. This is
reasonable, considering that many households in this group are living
in poverty. Another complicating factor contributing to these results
is that many members of the two upper-income groups are home-
owners rather than renters. A homeowner, viewing his house as an
investment as well as a consumption good, may desire to purchase a
unit in a zone where prices are rising rapidly, with a view to
capturing future capital gains.
Each zonal housing market is viewed as adjusting itself through
both price and quantity variations in all but the very long run. Excess
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her;is the62 Residential Location and Housing Choice,
Table 3-1.Estimates of Household Demand Equations by Two-Stage Least
Squaresa (figures in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors)
Symbol Type
A Priori
Expected Sign Estimated Coefficients
LowMiddle High Low Middle High
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R2 0.39 0.50 0.52
SSR . . 2.13 1.24 5.87
SE , ,0.11 0.13 0.28
Notes SE =standarderror of the regression.
R2=coefficientof multiple determination. *significajlt at 5 percent level in one-tailed
SSRsumof squared residuals. asymptotic test.
alhe instruments used with the endogenous variables were the exogenous variables of the
supply equations and the 1960 predetermined values of the endogenous variables. Except as
noted, all variables are 1960-1970 changes in ratios to the SMSA means.
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zonalprice and the zonal vacancy rate. The zonal vacancy rate for
the beginning of the decade, VAC RATE60, is included in the
demand equations. The VAC RATE60 coefficients increase in size
from the LOW equation, in which the coefficient is insignificant and
negative, through the HIGH one. This is consistent with the higher
opportunity costs of search for high-income households. In the
equations for HIGH- and MIDDLE-income families, the estimated
coefficients on VAC RATE60 are positive, as we expected on the
basis of a priori economic theory concerning the costs of search, and
they are statistically quite significant.
Four structuralattributes were utilizedin these preliminary
regressions: the percent of a .zone's units that are large (7 rooms or
more), A LARGE; the percent of a zone's units that are over thirty
years old, OLD60 the percent of a zone's units that have more than
one bathroom, ABA THROOMS; and the population density APOP-
DEN. The coefficients on ABA THROOMS increase in size from the
LOW to the HIGH equation, supporting the a priori expectation of a
much stronger preference for more luxurious and larger units by
higher-income families. The coefficients in MIDDLE and HIGH are
not only largein absolutesize,but are also statistically very
significant; the one in HIGH (0.74)is,in addition, the most
economically and statistically significant coefficient in the HIGH-
income equation.
The coefficients on OLD60 are all negative, consistent with our a
priori assumption that households prefer newer units, ceteris paribus;
and the values increase from LOW to HIGH, again as expected. The
coefficients in MIDDLE and HIGH are statistically fairly significant
and are, in addition, among the largest in absolute size. Indeed, the
variables characterizing the structural components 'of the zonal
housing package plays a very important role in our estimated demand
equations.
Population density, APOPDEN, also proved to be an important
variable:all the signs are negative, as expected, and increase in
absolute size from the LOW to the HIGH equation, supporting our
hypothesis that the higher the family's income, the stronger its
preference for low density. This observed preference of high-income
families for space partially explains the presence of the high-income
suburban ring so common in U.S. metropolitan areas.
All four of the social environmental attributes were found to be
significant in one or more of the equations. The percent of nonwhite
households in a zone was included to capture the• preference of
whites to live segregated from nonwhites. Both the percent nonwhite
at the beginning of the decade, BLACK60, and the change in the
percent nonwhite, ABLACK (treated as endogenous), were included,
and their estimated coefficients turned out to be statistically signifi-64 Residential Location and Housing Choice
r
cant in all three equations. The signs on both variables were positive
in the equation for LOW-income families, reflecting the high propor-
tion of nonwhites in this group: the majority of nonwhite house-
holds in the Boston SMSA are of low income.5 The coefficients of
both variables are negative in the MIDDLE and HIGH equations,
strongly confirming the preference for segregation by Boston SMSA
whites; and the larger negative coefficients on both variables in the
HIGH equation imply that this preference is more intense among
higher-income whites. It is noteworthy that the preference appears
quite strongly even when we control for the higher welfare popula-
tion, higher tax rates, poorer schools, and higher crime rates of the
central city—conditions often cited as reasons for the flight by whites
to the segregated suburban communities.
Approximately 65.6 percent of the low-income households were
on welfare in 1970. Therefore, it was expected that the coefficient
on the percent of a zone's households on welfare,
would be positive in the LOW equation. The results partially support
the hypothesis that the existence of a large welfare population in a
zone constitutes a "negative externality" to middle- and high-income
families independent of the fiscal burden caused by their presence
and independent of the crime rate to which a large welfare popula-
tion may contribute disproportionately. A priori, all family house-
holds were expected to prefer low relative crinie rates. This was
supported by the negatively signed coefficients on CRIME70 ob-
tained in all the estimated equations.
The local public service variables also proved significant. The
importance of the quality of the local public schools to the zonal
housing package is supported by our results. All three estimated
coefficients on were negative, as expected, as were those
for local effective tax rates. High-income families seem to be the
most sensitive to (or most adept at avoiding) high relative tax rates.
A priori, we expected that households at all income levels would
prefer more accessibility to less. The higher the relative value of the
general job accessibility index, AJOBACC, the lower is the zone's
accessibility. Therefore, a negatively signed coefficient was expected.
Some urban economists have argued that the poor have the strongest
preferences for accessibility. However, the rich would seem to incur
the highest opportunity cost for their time spent in commuting.
Therefore, the expected pattern of the size of the coefficients on
was uncertain. As can be seen from Table 3-1, low-income
families do prefer locations that are highly accessible to their jobs.
The positive coefficientsin the MIDDLE and HIGH equations
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expected. We are investigating this further with improved accessi-
bility measures.
The negatively signed estimated coefficients on the highway index
in all three equations suggest that the negative externalities generated
by highways crossing a zone are important. The absolute size of the
coefficients increases with the income level of the household, as
expected, i.e., high-income families are the most sensitive to the
negative externalities generated by highways. The automobile is the
major source of pollution and congestion in the Boston SMSA; these
results suggest that all households are sensitive to the externalities it
generates. To evaluate this interpretation, more recent work is
designed to disclose whether the highway variable reflects negative
externalities mostly, or some composite of such externalities and
facets of accessibility.
THESUPPLY OF HOUSING
Ourmodel of housing supply focuses on the number of housing units
made available to households in a zone and their structural type (in
terms of units per structure). In effect, we are modeling the behavior
of two basic types of housing supplier: builders of new units and
owners of existing ones. Conversion supply is given parity with new
construction, but with expectations that the determinants of the two
will differ to some extent.
Suppliers of housing presumably compare the present values of
revenues and costs when deciding upon a housing investment just as
would an investor in any other enterprise. The quantity and type of
housing forthcoming in any zone in a particular period will be related
to the costs and revenues of producing these units at the particular
location. A careful analysis of these costs and revenues for different
structural types and modes of supply provides the structural model
behind the supply equations.
The decision to supply a unit of housing is a decision to combine
factors of production, such as capital, labor, land, and possibly an
existing structure which can be converted, to produce a "new" unit.
The amount of housing produced in a zone will therefore depend on
the price and possibly the quantity of the factors available in the
zone, and on the final selling price of housing. Because capital and
labor are equally available at all zones in an SMSA and approxi-
mately at the same price (except perhaps for the availability of credit
to the ghetto), the major differences across zones will be in output
prices and in factors relating to land and to conversion of existing
structures.66 Residential Location and Housing Choice
Webegin our exposition of the housing supply model with a
discussion of new construction and of how the land market interacts
with new-supply decisions. Then the determination of the structural
type of new units is analyzed. Finally, a model of conversion supply
isproposed and estimated. This separate treatment should not
obliterate the fact that these sources and types of housing supply
interact and compete in and across all zones, both in the input
markets and in the housing market as a whole, where consumers are
faced with the full array of sources and types of units.
New Construction
Themost important input price variation for producers of new
housing units in a metropolitan area is the price of land. The
locational variation in the price of land. is the central focus of much
of the literature on urban land use and is important in our housing
supply model as well. Alonso (1960, 1965) and others (Richard
Muth, Edwin Mills, Lowdon Wingo) have developed models in which
competition among different kinds of users for scarce urban land
determines the price of land in each location and the allocation of
land among user types. The starting assumption of the models is that
the only differences in the marginal revenue productivity of different
locations in an urban area are due to distance to a central market,
whose proximity is valued differently by different users. The models
then predict concentric rings of land devoted to different urban uses,
and declining densities of any use as distance from the center
increases.
But metropolitan development does not take place literally as
these land use models depict, with all land in a given annulus used up
(at varying densities) before the next annulus is bid away from the
(given base-price) agricultural use. In fact, we observe parcels of
undeveloped vacant land at all distances from the "center," and the
percent vacant varies in a systematic way, increasing with distance
from the center. The price of this vacant land, other than at the very
edge of the urban area, is certainly not zero (or some constant
agricultural price). The price reflects the price of comparable (in a
locational sense) developed land, and hence relates to alternative uses
to which a lot could be put.
To understand the existence of vacant parcels in any annulus
within the urban area, we must assume that some of the demand (for
the fixed amount of land in the annulus) is by demanders who
choose not to devel'op the land to whatever its most profitable
current use is. Vacant land yields no revenue in the present, and in
fact is liable to taxes; yet buyers hold it vacant. These buyers are
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Simultaneous Estimation of the Supply and Demand 67
willingto pay as much as producers who turn it to revenue-yielding
purposes (or if they already hold it vacant, they are willing to resist
such bids by producers). It must be that they expect other returns.
Specifically, holders of vacant land speculate on rising land values.
When these speculators choose to "cash in" their capital gains, they
can be seen as suppliers of vacant land to producers of housing or
nonresidential services.If speculators' reservation prices (below
which they wish to hold land vacant) are distributed randomly
(perhaps because of risk preferences and expectations), then the land
supply curve has its usual upward slope: the lower the market price,
the larger the number of speculators whose reservation price is not
exceeded, hence, who hold land. Taxes on land value will reinforce
this slope, since they increase carrying costs of holding land vacant as
its price rises.
As demand by other land usersin the annulus grows, the
opportunity cost of holding land vacant is higher, and hence less of it
is held. "Other" demand for land is derived from business use, use by
the public sector and other institutions, and residential land use. We
expect this derived demand for land in any one location (or annulus)
to be quite price-elastic, since close substitutes (nearby parcels) exist.
Therefore, demanders arbitrage across land markets to keep prices in
line with marginal revenue productivity (which depends on "accessi.
bility" in the eyes of the highest bidder). As a result, we observe that
the curves of land prices and land use densities predicted by land use
models decline as we move away from the center and the shares of
vacant land increase. As population or income in an urban area grows
over time, the derived demand for land in all uses increases. As a
result, more and more land is absorbed into the urban fringe, and
vacant land within the developed urban area declines. The metropoli-
tan area develops simultaneously out and up, extensively and
intensively.
In the context of this housing supply model, each "location" to
which the analysis is applied is a city, town, district with fixed total
land area. In each zone, speculators are assumed to behave in the
same way, "supplying" increasing fractions of the total land to other
uses as demand (hence price) increases. Thus a relation in which the
price of land is a decreasing function of share of land vacant is
assumed to hold across towns. This assumption does not imply that
holders of vacant land control the price of land, for in fact the price
is the outcome of interaction among all land users who arethe
market for land. Rather, this speculation model is chosen as a useful
way to look at "land supply" to housing producers and others.
Similar stories can be told for subdivision of occupied lots, reclama-68 Residential Location and Housing Choice
tionof marginal acreage, and many other forms of land supply. The
outcome of this approach is that the percent of vacant land is a good
indicator of the price of land.
Other inputs into new housing production may be limited for the
whole urban area, but each zone is a small part of that area and
hence suppliers can be considered to perceive these inputs as
perfectly elastically supplied.
We model new housing as produced by a competitive industry
with a production function having constant returns to scale:
Q=Q(L,N) (3-6)
where Q is total housing units produced and L and N are the amount
of land and nonland inputs, respectively. This production function
implies a relationship between output price and factor prices:
p=p(r,n) (3-7)
where r and n are the price of land and nonland inputs, respectively,
and p is the price of a unit of housing.
If the elasticity of substitution between land and nonland inputs
in the production of housing is not zero, producers will use less land
and more nonland inputs to produce a unit of housing where land
price is higher. Consequently, the land input per housing unit is a
function of the price of land (or really the factor price ratio):
L/QEm=m(r/n) or L=m(r/n)Q (3-8)
where L is total land used by housing suppliers and, hence, m is the
land per unit, or lot size.
In the previous section we developed the proposition that the
price of land can be expressed as a function of the fraction
"developed," i.e.,
rr(V/T)=r(v)=r[(T—L—J)/T] (3-9)
where T istotal land area in a town; J, land area previously
developed; V,the amount vacant; vV/T. For simplicity this
function is often assumed to have a constant elasticity.
If all these functions are well-behaved, then from (3-7), (3-8), and
(3-9) we can derive"supply function" for housing in each town
which relates quantity produced to output price, incorporating the
effect of land development on the factor input price:
p:
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p =f(Q/T)or QIT =s(p) = r' (p) (3-10)
Q/T can be thought of as gross residential density or, more simply, as
a quantity of output along a supply curve that has been standardized
for the size of city or town. The price of land rises as more land in a
town is developed. For the housing new construction industry, this
rising factor supply schedule causes supply to be an increasing
function of price, in spite of constant returns to scale in production.
The shape of this supply curve depends crucially upon two of the
underlying relationships: the responsiveness of lot size (and hence
total derived demand for land at any output level) to changes in the
price of land and the responsiveness of the price of land to changes in
the quantity developed (or demanded) by housing producers.
Taking percent derivatives of supply equation (3-10) at a point, we
obtain the relationship between output prices and quantities given by




where kN and kL are the factor shares, eL is the price elasticity of
land supply, a is the elasticity of substitution between the factors of
production, and the prices of nonland inputs are held constant. If
a =1,the factor shares are constant, and the price elasticity of
housing supply varies with the price elasticity of the supply of land
for new construction. The speculation model of vacant land release
suggests that the price elasticity of the residential land supply varies
directly with the supply of vacant land. Thus we would expect
housing to be more elastically supplied in the suburbs than in dense
central-city areas. Our econometric specification must recognize this
variation in elasticity across the metropolitan area.
If a < 1 (Muth 1969, pp. 82-83 and 315, offers support for this
hypothesis) the factor shares are a function of factor prices, and
share of land in housing will be greater in the city center than in the
suburban fringe of a metropolitan area, where land is less expensive.
Thus, in the non-Cobb-Douglas case, the implication of Equation
(3-11) is that there is a second factor contributing to the higher price
elasticity of housing supplyin the less-developed areas of the
metropolitan region: The effect of the lower price elasticity of land
• supply is augmented by the greater sensitivity of output price to land
price (higher land share) in producing a lower price elasticity of
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An additional element that varies among zones and directly affects
the new housing production function is the amount of land in other
uses. It has the same effects on the price and elasticity of the supply
of land as does the amount of land consumed by housing producers.
Housing producers in a town with increasing "other land use" face
higher land prices, ceteris paribus, according to (3-9). Thus we need
to include in (3-11) a term reflecting any shifts in the land supply
curve during the decade. (Differing initial conditions are captured by
the initial supply elasticity of land.) The appropriate form for this
equation has also been derived by Muth (1974) and is
________
(3-12)
where eListhe elasticity of supply of L with respect to J (other
land and dJ/J is the percent change in J. The greater the
increase in other land use, the less land there is available to housing
producers, hence the less housing production, ceteris paribus. When
we assume a constant elasticity in (3-9) the second term in (3-12)
simplifies to dJ/L.
The foregoing are not the only factors that impinge on the supply
of new housing in a metropolitan area. Because of the lags that
characterize adjustments in housing market price and quantity and
the unitary character of purchases or leases (one household to one
housing unit), vacancy rates are an important adjustment mechanism
in equating housing supply and demand. Thus builders of new units
can be expected to use vacancy rate changes as indicators of the
direction of future price movements. Since occupancy rates are
almost never 100 percent, they also indicate the probability of
actually selling or leasing a unit when it is made available on the
market. Both of these points suggest that when vacancy rates are
high or rising, producers will be discouraged from adding to the
housing stock.
Within the separate jurisdictions of a metropolitan area, there are
also important government interventions into the operations of the
housing market. Cities and towns in a metropolitan area have various
zoning policy tools at their disposal to try to control or direct the
residentialandnonresidential development of the jurisdiction.
Municipalities can zone limited areas for business and commercial
use, set up residential subareas with differing maximum density
limits (height, frontage, lot size), and grant or withhold variances to
the rules they establish. Such regulations may simply cause producers'312' dQ dp dJdVACRATE
" / —=a+a [f(v)—]+a —+a +a OPEN+e
0 1 2 L VA.C RATE
(3-13)
where Q,v,p, J, and L are defined as above, d VAC RATE/VAC
RATE is the percent change in the housing unit vacancy rate, and
OPEN is the fraction of land in the town which is both vacant and
not restricted to minimum lot sizes greater than 25,000 square feet.
The function frepresentsthe relationship between percent land
vacant and the parameters discussed earlier that enter the price
elasticity term: the elasticity of substitution, the factor shares, and
the elasticity of land supply. Although we know that f(u) is an
increasing function we do not know its exact functional form. For
simplicity we assume that f depends on the ratio of vacant land to
residential land at the beginning of the period. Therefore, we expect
a1 and a4 to be positive and a2 and a3 to be negative.
The supply relation was estimated using decadal percent changes
in the number of housing units in a cross section of 89 Boston
metropolitan area subregions. The equation is estimated by TSLS,
with prices and vacancy rates treated as endogenous. The instruments
are taken from the demand equation. Because the equation is
nonlinear in the variables, nonlinear functions of the exogenous
variables are also valid instruments, and several of these are used.
The estimated equation with asymptotic standard errors is given
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toput units they would have built anyway into spatially contiguous
homogeneous subareas, or the effect may actually be to restrict some
kinds, of housing production in the zone. If producers are prevented
from using the land-per-unit ratio of their choice, their profits may
be reduced, and one would expect less housing production. Zoning
regulations on minimum lot size, for example, when binding, reduce
the amount of effective land available to producers.
From (3-11) and the additional factors discussed above, we derive
a supply equation for new construction to be estimated econometri-
cally:
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The standard error of the regression =0.13;R2 =0.4358.The overall
fit of the equation is reasonable, the individual coefficients have
small standard errors, and the signs are as expected. In particular, the
t ratios on the price elasticity and vacancy rate are quite large.
The estimates imply price elasticities of new housing supply that
range from 0.87 in the open suburbs to almost zero (0.000 7) in the
dense center city. In addition, new housing will be forthcoming as
vacancy rates are decreased; so the net response due to changing
demand conditions will be felt through both price and quantity
measures. Alternative land uses do appear to compete strongly for
land and will act to discourage new supply. The availability of vacant
land that does not face zoning restrictions will lead to new construc-
tion.
StructuralTypes of New Construction
Havingproposed and estimated a model of new-construction
supply of housing units for geographic zones in a metropolitan area,
we turn now to a careful examination of structural types in new
housing. Where the price of land is higher (across zones or over time
within a zone), a housing unft will be produced with less land relative
to other inputs to economize on the more expensive factor. This
factor substitution is expected whether we think there are different
technologies for different structural types (and each structural type
is built where its technology is most profitable), or one technology
foralltypes,as long as that one has a nonzero elasticity of
substitution. If there are different technologies, but one output in
the eyes of the consumers, then one technology will be most
profitable with given input prices, and the situation is much the same
as under the assumption of one technology, except that there may be
kinks or discontinuities in the supply function. Equation (3-8)
implies that for any given land price, the land per unit (lot size) of
new construction is uniquely determined, decreasing as land price
increases. If we could define structural types in terms of a range of
land-to-nonland input ratios, given any input price ratio, we would
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Note: r = price of land input; nprice of nonland input; Lamount of land input; N =
amount of nonland input. Other variables are defined in the appendix.
Figure 3.1.
However,when we actually observe the structural types of new
construction in different zones in the metropolitan area, we do not
see such unanimity as to the appropriate type for each zone. Within
the theoretical context of this model, there are several reasons for
this lack of uniformity.
First ofall, our "observations" are for an entire decade of
new-construction responses. The model suggests that over that time
span, it might well be that residential and other development could
cause the price of land to cross a threshold between types, thus
'making appropriate at least two types of structural response within a
town when the decade is taken as a whole.
Second, cities, towns, and districts are not completely homo-
geneous areas, although we treat them as such in the model. We argue74 Residential Location and Housing Choice
thatthe degree of homogeneity within a town isgreater than
similarities between towns. However, neighborhood attributes affect
land prices within towns as well, but at a lower degree of variation.
In using these zones as our unit of observation, we have abstracted
from this internal heterogeneity. Furthermore, we may expect some
"smearing" near the edges of jurisdictions. If one town's "appropri-
ate" structural type is single-family and its neighbor's is multifamily
units, we may see some overlap at the border.
Third, historical and institutional restrictions interfere with the
deterministic effect of land price on structural type. Zoning, neigh-
borhood effects, and the timing of release of land parcels and, their
size (whether through demolition, lot splitting, or sales of vacant
land) may make only one structural type possible on a given lot, even
though, given full flexibility, a producer would combine land and
other inputs in different proportions.
Finally, there is a problem of measurement or definition. The
production function implies that the land-nonland ratio responds as a
continuous function of the price of land (as depicted in Figure 3-1),
that is, lot size decreases as the price of land increases. What we
measure with our census data on structural type (single, multifamily
defined as composed of two to four units, and apartments with five
or more units per structure) only corresponds very crudely to a
measure of land per unit or an input ratio of land to nonland. A
single-family unit on a small lot might have less land per unit than a
large-lot duplex or even a low-rise "garden apartment" complex.
Thus we may classify units in the wrong segment of the continuum.
Taking all these effects into account, we still expect the price of
land to be a good predictor of structural type. However, rather than
being an on-off switch between types, the relationship between land
price and the distribution of structural types in new construction is
expected to be smoother, sinceall the factors discussed above
contribute to heterogeneity of types, given land price.
Local-government actions such as zoning and provision of sewers
can also affect the choice of structural type built by the producer.
The availability of sewer lines has been used explicitly 'by local
governments to control development in some areas around Washing-
ton, D.C. It may or may not be cheaper to build a particular housing
unit where sewers are available, because the cost of internal sewage
treatment systems (septic tank) need not be included by the builder,
but connections to the sewer system must be built. However,
high-rise structures cannot be serviced by septic tanks. Thus, sewer
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Simultaneous Estimation of the Supply and Demand 75
Zoning,cited above as one of the interferences between land price
and structural type, is a local-government policy tool whose impact
can be modeled more explicitly. Zoning regulations generally restrict
housing producers' choices asymmetrically, thatis,they set a
maximum (e.g., unit per land area density or height) and allow any
uses which do not exceed the maximum. We want to model two such
types of zoning regulations. One variable is a zero-one dummy for
the casein which the town zoning code prohibits apartment
structures; the apartment share of new construction is then expected
to be zero, and the variable is included by multiplying it (A =0when
apartments are banned) by allthe right-hand variables in the
apartment share equation. The second type of zoning is the establish-
ment of lot size minima for part or all of the residential (and vacant)
area of a town. The variable is a measure of the percent of the town
that is restricted to lot sizes greater than 25,000 square feet. Where
this minimum lot size applies, any units built must be single-unit
structures surrounded by over half an acre 'of land. Thus, if a town's
residential and vacant land isall so zoned, all units built will be
singles.If a town has no zoning, the price of land and sewer
availability will determine the shares of each structural type in total
new construction. If minima apply in part of a town, singles will be
built in that part and land price and sewer availability wifi determine







where risthe price of land, A is the apartment-banned dummy








wherePZ is the fraction of land zoned for lot sizes greater than
25,000 square feet, arid UZ is 1.0 minus PZ, the share unzoned.76 Residential Location and Housing Choice
Thefraction of decadal new construction that is single family and The
the fraction for apartment units (five or more units in the structure) expected directj1
are therefore modeled as functions of the price of land, zoning, and except for the h
sewer availability. The share of new construction that is multifamily if fraction vacar
(two to four units in the structure) is the residual, that is, total new sense from that
construction less singles and apartment units. Figure 3-2.
Land price is represented, as before, by percent of land vacant at SEWER entei
the beginning of the period. The 1960 percent vacant land is entered. ten percentage
into the equations as a set of seven dummy variables (Vi through three percentag
V7), each of a range of values of the variable. It is discrete rather singles, ceteris
than continuous, because, as postulated earlier, land price is not a SINGLE equati
linear function of percent vacant, and even if it were, we would not from unity, wi
expect the shares of new construction that are single or apartment zoning variable
units to be linear functions of land price, their exclusion
Our regressions were run using ordinary least squares. The results variable by imp
were as follows (standard errors are shown in parentheses below squared residual
coefficients):
ConversionSi
NEWSINGLE =.958PZ— .00278 UZ*SEWER The second
NEW TOTAL(.0425) (.00111) changing existii
quantity of ser
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R2 =0.7770; standard error of the regression =0.149.Simultaneous Estimation of the Supply and Demand 77
Theprogression of coefficients across the categoriesisin the
expected directions (increasing for singles, decreasing for apartments)
except for the last category. In each case, the coefficient on V7 (1
if fraction vacant0.5) is not significantly different in a statistical
sense from that on V6. These coefficients are displayed graphically in
Figure 3-2.
SEWER enters both equations as expected, implying that for each
ten percentage points of sewer availability in a zone, an additional
three percentage points of new construction are apartments, not
singles, ceteris paribus. A t test of the coefficient on PZ in the
SINGLE equation shows it is not statistically significantly different
from unity, which is what the model predicted. The use of the
zoning variables multiplicatively (both UZ and A) surpasses either
their exclusion or their inclusion as a separate linear continuous
variable by improving both the overall fit (higher R2, lower sum of
squared residuals) and the individual coefficients.
ConversionSupply
Thesecond major means of housing stock adjustment is by
changing existing housing units to provide a different quality or
quantity of services. By 1970, over 10 percent of the 1960 Boston
SMSA housing stock (and almost 20 percent of the 1960 City of
Boston stock) had been demolished, lost through other means, or
changed by conversion or merger. Considering the size of the housing
stock in comparison with new construction, these data indicate that
such processes have an important impact on aggregate housing
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Note: See appendix for definition of variables.
Figure 3.2.78 Residential Location and Housing Choice
conversion-demolition is on changes in the number of housing units
and their structural type (units in structure). What we call the
conversion-demolition process includes a number of distinct activities
by property owners: converting a structure by increasing or decreas-
ing the number of housing units it encloses; and withdrawing the
units in a structure from the housing stock through conversion to
nonresidential use or through demolition. Demolition may take place
because a structure is worn out or because other uses for the site are
more profitable; it may be done in order to create open space or to
make possible the construction of a new (residential or nonresiden-
tial) structure on the site. In the latter case, only half the process
(the demolition) is considered as conversion-demolition; the replace-
ment structure (if residential) is a part of new construction.
In the discussion of residential new construction, the point was
emphasized that as an area develops and the price of land rises, the
lot size (or the factor input ratio of land to nonland) of newly built
units declines. Since units are durable, as development occurs, units
of different densities may be found side by side. The older units
display factor proportions which no longer reflect the least-cost
technology, once factor prices have changed (generally with higher
relative prices of land), that is, these units are not of the type that
would be built in that location if all the development had occurred in
the present; or, looking at the issue from the other side, replacement
units would economize more on land.
Conversion supply is accomplished, as is new construction, by the
combination of land, labor, capital, and materials inputs. Conversion
supply differs from new construction in that certain of the inputs—
land and some of the capital—are already in place in a given quantity
and form. Converters do not deal in the market for land; thus, they
respond to a set of signals different from those faced by new
suppliers. Owners (or potential purchasers of existing property)
compare the operating costs and revenues of the current use with the
incremental capital costs (and demolition costs) and operating costs
and revenues of uses to which the structure could be converted (or
by which it could be replaced). Because incremental costs are smaller
for conversion than for demolition-new construction, less disequilib-
rium is required to elicit the former than the latter supply response.
In the aggregate (that is, adding up the decisions of the individual
suppliers) the most important determinant of conversion-demolition
supply activity in a zone is the stock and type of housing units
available. The extent to which demand for housing in the area has
risen since the units were put in place, i.e., the degree to which the
stock is out of equilibrium, is also a factor. Increased demand,
expressed per ui
area, that is, the
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expressedper unit of area, encourages more intensive uses of the
area, that is, the production of more housing units on the given land.
(Conversion will occur when output price times the new number of
units in the structure minus annual incremental capital and operating
costs is greater than output price times the old number of units.)
Thus, in a rough sense, we would expect more conversion activity
(whether addition or subtraction of units) in old units than in new,
because the former are less well-adapted to current demand condi-
tions. In addition, worn-out units, whether old or not, are most
likely to be demolished, since their current returns are not as high as
they would be on potential replacements. Demolition activity thus
reflects the need for normal replacement as well as radical conver-
sion. The latter, demolition for replacement with a very different
kind of structure, is more costly than building the structure on
vacant land, and hence is undertaken only when the current structure
is very far out of equilibrium and when there is very little vacant land
(these two conditions occur together not coincidentally but rather
because of the way the land market operates).6
In addition to the existing stock and its current appropriateness,
many of the same local conditions that affect new construction also
affect conversion-demolition activity. High housing unit vacancy
rates are a signal of excess supply in the market. To an individual
supplier, the significance of a vacant unit is that there is no current
return to be foregone by changing the property use. Price changes act
in much the same way, except that since they reflect the rate of price
change for both the original and resultant structures, they may not
indicate the direction of conversion. Government programs such as
urban renewal and public housing have direct impacts through
land-clearing demolition and various kinds of subsidies to rehabilita-
tion or alteration activity, and through these direct impacts may also
affect decisions made by competing private suppliers in the same
zone. Zoning, whereittakes the form of minimum lot sizes,
presumably inhibits the conversion of single-unit structures into
multi-unit types, although often such zoning is enacted to control
future development of open land rather than to impose restrictions
on existing units.
The results of estimating conversion-demolition equations are
shown in Table 3-2. In each case, the dependent variable is the net
decadal change in units of that structural type per acre not due to
new construction. The dependent variable and independent variables
relating to housing stock (old stocks, deteriorating stocks, public
housing) are divided by total acreage to control for the effects of
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LEASED PUB HOU -0.954 -3.93
(endogenous) . (0.499) (0.582)
NEW TIGHT —0.000500 —0.000733
(endogenous) •(0.0000909) (0.000132)
R2 .9186 .9540 .9874
SE .112 .117 .147
activity taking place. The very strong importance of existing stocks is
well documented in the table. In each equation, the deteriorating
stock is highly associated with demolitions. Old stock accounts for
much of the conversion activity, the general direction being to
increase densities, although a small share of multifamily units may be
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muchvacant land (measured by NEW TIGHTNEW TOTAL/
VA CANT ACRES, treated as endogenous) contributes significantly
to demolitions of singles and multis. NEW TIGHT is not included in
the apartment equation because apartments are less often torn down
to make room for new units. This issince apartments already
represent a more intensive use of land, and demolition costs are
higher, than is the case for singles or multis.
The aggregate data we have suggest that most (three-quarters) of
the changes in the singles stock, measured by CONV SINGLE, are
demolitions (CONV SINGLE is negative for every city, town, and
district in the sample). Thus, the significantly positive sign on price
in the CONV SINGLE equation is not surprising. Where returns are
rising, existing uses are not abandoned. Similarly, where vacancy
rates are high, more demolitions occur. In the other equations,
CONV is a mixture of conversions (in and out) and demolitions, and
the price change coefficients are not significantly different from
zero.
Zoning appears insignificant in all the equations, suggesting that it
is more effective with regard to new construction. The other
government policy tool, public housing, has a strong impact on
conversion-demolition, especially of apartments. It appears that the
more conventional forms of public housing, in which subsidies are
provided for construction or rehabilitation, have a positive effect on
the number of apartment (and multifamily) units, but that the leased
public housing program discourages augmentation of the stock
through conversion, or encourages demolitions. However, it should
be noted that simply treating these public housing variables as
endogenous does not enable us to distinguish between the effects of
the public housing programs and the housing conditions that cause a
jurisdiction to adopt the public housing approach for solving its
housing problems.
SUMMARY
Inconcluding, we wish merely to note the special features of our
approach and the chief thrust of our findings. Demand and supply
relations for housing units have been derived and estimated using
simultaneous equation econometric methods. The supply functions
determine changes indifferent numbers and types of housing
structure in the different zones; the demand functions determine the
zonal distribution of the population partitioned into three income
groups. Through price and vacancy rate change, supply and demand
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Thedemand relations model the decadal change in the proportion
Symbol
of each income group locating in each zone as a function of NEW SINGLE
accommodation prices, vacancy rates, and zonal attributes. This last NEW MULTI
can be broadly described as including public service and tax rate NEW APART
variables and structural, socio-environmental, and accessibility at- NEW TOTAL
tributes. Our results suggest that different income groups have CONy SiNGLE
different relative tastes for these attributes. Two supply modes are
treatedseparately—new construction and conversion-demolition. CONVMULTI
Decadal changes in new units in any zone are a function of expected CONV APART
revenue changes (as reflected in price changes and vacancy rates) and
expected costs, largely differential availability and land costs, as CONV TOTAL
reflectedininitial vacant acres and minimum lot zoning. The
composition of new construction in terms of structural types is OLD
determined largely by land prices that indicate differing land-capital LARGE
ratios. Decadal changes in zonal units through conversion-demolition BATHROOMS
arelargely a function of the same expected revenue and cost DETERIORATE
measures that reflect the number of existing structures of different POP DEN
type, age, and condition in the zone that are available for inexpensive BLACK
conversion or ripe for demolition. CRIME
Our econometric estimations, by TSLS, generally gave encouraging WELFARE
results. The overall fits were reasonable and the signs and patterns of
VACANTACRESa
relative magnitude of coefficients across structural type and supply MLS ZONING
mode on the supply side, and household type on the demand side are
SEWER
generally consistent with a priori expectations. Several variables do RATIO
show puzzling results, and in our ongoing work we are attempting to EFF TAX
deal with problems exposed in the first stage of our study reported JOB ACC
here.
Appendix3A: List of Variables
Exceptas indicated, all data pertain to individual zones.
RESIDENTIAL Symbol Description
TOTAL ACRESa
LOW Number of family households earning less than $7,000 in 1970 HIGHWAY
dollars
MIDDLE Number of family households earning between $7,000 and
$15,000inl97Odoilars VACRATE
HIGH Number of family households earning over $15,000 in 1970
dollars ICE
SINGLE Number of single-family housing units divided by total acreage PZ
MULTI Number of multifamily housing units divided by total acreage
APART Number of apartment units divided by total acreage liz
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Description
Number of single units in 1970 built since 1960
Number of multifamily units in 1970 built since 1960
Number of apartment units in 1970 built since 1960
Total number of units in 1970 built since 1960
196 0-to-1970 change per acre in stock of single-family units due
to conversions, retirements, and demolitions
1960-to-1970 change per acre in stock of multifamily units due
to conversions, retirements, and demolitions
1960-to-1970 change per acre in stock of apartment units due to
conversions, retirements, and demolitions
1960-to-1970 change per acre in total number of housing units
not due to new construction
Percent of 1960 units built before 1930
Percent of all units with 7 or more rooms
Percentage of all units with more than one bathroom
Percentage of all units that are deteriorating
Population per acre of land: residential, vacant, and recreational
Percent of population that is nonwhite
Comprehensive crime rate of Federal Bureau of Investigation
Percent of households on welfare
Number of acres of vacant land
Percent of residential and vacant land zoned for lot sizes larger
than 25,000 square feet
Sewer availability: percent of population served by public sewers
Pupils-teacher ratio in high schools
Effective property tax rate

















where C.K =traveltime from zone / to zone K and XK =
of income type (HIGH, MIDDLE, or LOW) in zone
K relative to SMSA total employment of that income type
Number of acres in residential use
Total acreage minus acres under open water
Highway availability index: [3 (number of limited access super-
highways) +2(number of four-lane highways) +numberof
two-lane highwaysj ÷ total acreage
Overall housing unit vacancy rate: (units vacant for rent +vacant
for sale) ÷ occupied and vacant units
Housing price 1970 ÷ housing price 1960
Fraction of area zoned for minimum lot sizes greater than
25,000 square feet: MLS ZONING ÷ 100
Fraction of area not zoned for minimum lot sizes greater than
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Description
Acres of land devoted to manufacturing
Estimate of fraction of area vacant and not subject to minimum
lot size zoning: UZ *VACP
Zero-one dummy: A =0when town's zoning code prohibits
apartments
Estimate of number of single units per acre more than 30 years
old: SINGLE *OLD
Estimate of number of multifamily units per acre in structures
more than 30 years old: MULTI *OLD
Estimate of number of apartment units per acre in structures
more than 30 years old: APART *OLD
Estimate of number of single-family units per acre which are
deteriorating: SINGLE *DETERIORATE
Estimate of number of multifamily units per acre which are
deteriorating: MULTI *DETERIORATE
Estimate of number of apartment units per acre which are
deteriorating: APART *DETERIORATE
Number of "conventional" and "turnkey" (federal) public hous-
ing units per acre in 1974
2. There will be
these zones the
not strictly be a ste;
3. Our more rec
substituting two c
measures a given z
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Number of units of federally sponsored leased public housing per
acre in 1974
Number of new housing units built during 1960-197 0 per acre of
vacantlandinitiallyavailable: NEW TOTAL VACANT
ACRES; measures likelihood of demolition activity as means of
making land available for new construction
VACP VACANTACRES-'- TOTAL ACRES
The seven dummy variables for vacant land are defined as follows:
V1 =1if VACP < 0.05; 0 otherwise
V2 =lii0.05VACP < 0.10; 0 otherwise
V3=1 VACP<0.20;Ootherwise
V4 =1if 0.20VACP<0.30;0 otherwise
VS =1if 0.30 (VACP<0.40;0otherwise
V6 =1if 0.40VACP <0.50; 0 otherwise
V7 =1if 0.50VACP; 0 otherwise
aThe 1960 acreage data is derived from a 1963 land-use survey; the 1970 data, from a 1972
survey.
NOTESTO CHAPTER THREE
1."Potential" rather than "actual" because different households work at
different locations in the SMSA and thus have different actual accessibilities
from a common origin.Simultaneous Estimation of the Supply and Demand 85
t subject to minimum
toningcode prohibits
more than 30 years
per acre in structures
acre in Structures
ts per acre which are
per acre which are
per acre which are
public hous-
ed public housing per
970 per acre of
'OTAL ÷ VACANT
activity as means of
70 data, from a 1972
work at
accessjbjljtjes
2. There will be a few zones with multiple occupancy. As shown above, in
these zones the market price will be below the bid of the highest bidder so f will
not strictly be a step function.
3. Our more recent econometric work improves on the treatment of price by
substituting two different price variables for the simple one used here. One
measures a given zone's price relative to the average for zones closely substi-
tutable to it; the other measures the average for the zone and that closely
substitutable group relative to the SMSA average.
4. Indexes could not be constructed for some zones. Therefore, the rates of
change over the decade 1960-1970 were projected upon the census rates of
change of value and composition to obtain an approximation for the other
zones.
5. The dependent variables of these estimated equations contain households
of all races. Currently we are separating out the nonwhite households so as to
estimate separate income class demand equations for them, and determine
whether low-income whites have similar preferences to whites in the high- and
middle-income groups or are closer to the present mixed low-income group.
6. In a more recent treatment than is reported here we attempt to elaborate
relative conversion costs further by separately determining conversions to the
different structural types, and by using as explanatory variables in the separate
equations the number of existing units of each structural type.
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Few economists would quarrel with an econometric anal-
ysis of housing market behavior designed to pay careful
attention to the three characteristics of the market for
residential services—durability, fixity, and heterogeneity—that distm-
guish it from most other economic markets.
In reacting to this "preliminary analysis" or progress report on
model building, I wish to emphasize two points in particular. First,
to my knowledge, this analysis represents the first attempt to sketch
out and estimate empirically a model of housing supply behavior
which differentiates housing by type over urban space. Secondly, the
class of models represented by this work-in-progress is directed
toward a quite demanding standard. Until quite recently, there were
practically no analyses of the housing market that were not based on
the convenient, but rather unsatisfactory, assumptions that housing
services are homogeneous, that vacancy rates are zero, that markets
are in long-run equilibrium, and that locations are along a line. A
research design intended to deal in a serious way with the complexity
of the durable, heterogeneous, and locationally fixed housing com-
modity has a potentially high payoff.
A serious investigation of the supply and demand for housing
services within a single metropolitan area faces formidable difficul-
ties. What we call the housing market is really an interrelated market
for two kinds of goods. One of these is a market for the services of
residential capital—those services provided by a structure type, a
Note: In preparing these remarks, I benefited from discussion with Eric A.
Hanushek.
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configurationof living space, and so forth. However, since the
consumption of these services is site specific, the economic actors
must also compete in a market for locations—which provide such
services as accessibility, public goods, and "neighborhoods."
This complementarity suggests several possible strategies in devel-
oping econometric models of these markets for subsequent testing.
Strategy A, the most desirable but the most complex approach,
would involve specifying the complete set of interrelated supply and
demand relationships, to include both housing attributes and loca-
tion simultaneously. The objective of this strategy would be to
untangle the choices really being made by economic actors:
1. Households, which substitute among alternative housing units or
"types" and among alternative locations or "zones" in response to
relative prices, that is, the market price of each type of housing
available in each zone.
2. Entrepreneurs, who produce,through new constructionor
through conversion, changes in the number of units of various
types at alternative locations in response to these ,same market
prices.
The key point is that market prices, which vary jointly by type
and location, make some types of residential capital more desirable
to certain kinds of households at one location and to other kinds of
households at other locations. This same set of prices causes the
profitability of supply transformations to vary by type and location.
An equilibrating process adjusts prices and vacancy rates to reduce
suppliers' profit differentials and households' incentives to move.
Something tolerably approaching a short-run equilibrium may well
result.
The mere outline of the intricacy implicit in this line of inquiry
for modeling housing market interactions may help us understand
why little progress has been made in implementing such a complex
strategy. Since there are many possibilitiesfor substitution in
consumption and in production, there are a host of potentially
important cross-price effects that affect the behavior of consumers
and suppliers. In addition, there are unresolved measurement prob-
lems inhibiting econometric applications; we have only a crude
understanding of the appropriate way to measure those housing
bundles whose prices vary and those significant characteristics of
locations over which 'they vary.
Two more limited research strategies would focus serious attention
on either housing services or locational attributes and would treat the
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For example, abstratcing from locational considerations, strategy
B would specify a behavioral model for exploring the supply and
demand relationships for housing bundles or types of dwellings. Such
a strategy would explore the interrelationships among the segmented
submarkets for types of dwellings that are only imperfectly linked
through substitutions in production and consumption. In its pure
form, this strategy would assume that locational attributes were
ubiquitous or would "hold them constant" in a crude way to focus
attention on the market for housing services. Alternatively, strategy
C would focus attention on the supplies of and the demands for
locational characteristics by different kinds of households and would
neglect or "hold constant" in some plausible way the stocks of
residential capital and their spatial distribution. Either of these lines
of inquiry would lead to an econometric model which would provide
only limited, but potentially useful, insight into the complex inter-
dependencies of the urban housing market; either would improve our
understanding of how the market process works.
Bradbury et al. claim to "model a demand for housing accommo-
dation and its supply" and present "preliminary estimates as evi-
dence of its promise." Since the study is largely empirically oriented,
its success must be judged, not by the revelation of theoretical
insight, but on other important grounds—the choice of research
strategy, the attention to issues of measurement, and the interest and
importance of the empirical results.
•The authors choose a curious mixed strategy for analyzing be-
havior in the housing market. They discuss their strategy as if they
had estimated supply and demand relationships using strategy A, but
in fact they have chosen the strategy "one from column B and one
from column C."
The analysis presents little justification for the formulation of the
particular supply and demand relationships the authors choose to
estimate. They rely mainly on Marshallian insight that a standard
supply and demand curve characterize a market. Indeed, we do not
discover until later that the analysis has been formulated so that
there is no prior sign on the slope of the supply curve and that the
demand curve could have a positive slope for high-income house-
holds!
The verbal analysis includes an excellent discussion of the role of
prices and vacancy rates in equilibrating the supply and demand sides
of the market, but it appears that in empirical application the
.supplies and demands are for different goods in separate but related
markets.
The demand sideof the market is characterized by several
equations that focus on locational attributes and virtually ignore90 Residential Location and Housing Choice
housingavailability; the strategy comes from column C. Regressions which are so are reported that relate changes in population distributions across The same eighty-nine locationsor zones to nine variables measuring the response, and I locationalattributes of the zones, three measures of the housing importance in stock, a price change term, and the vacancy rate. disequilibrium.' This formulation implicitly assumes that housing attributes are Note that homogeneous within zones (which are defined as seventy-five sub- with littleeff( urban towns and fourteen zones in the city of Boston) and that they residential capi are virtually ubiquitous across the metropolitan area. The formula- differences am tion assumes away virtually any spatial differentiation among hous- capitalized loca ing stocks that would cause households to substitute among different as the output pi
locations, i.e., it disregards characteristics of the housing stock that the slope of th are available in suburban Lincoln but not the South End of Boston demanders for
and which would affect consumer choice. Boston housing Of particular importance in the analysis is the price measure This is, of c because it is the key variable in motivating housing demanders to econometric an
substitute among housing types and locations. The price change term standards, and is computed from an index based on repeat sales in each of the cients—theirsii eighty-nine zones. The only thing that matters in the derivation of submit, howev
this index is the sale price of a given property in two calendar years. puzzling a prior Thus the measure implicitly assumes that the prices of all dwelling and conclude tF units in each town changed proportionately throughout the decade. theoretical
To the extent that there is more turnover in single-family housing authors examin than in multifamily or apartment units, the price term does not conclude it is"
measure price variations in the latter two very well. In any case, the When others b
construction of the index assumes that the rate of price change of all 1.40, 0.76, and
properties within each of the towns is identical. But if the rates of In the supply
price appreciation of different types of residential housing varied for conversions of
the metropolitan area as a whole, the index could well be measuring density structui
the distribution of the types of housing across towns. (Indeed, if the activity in the
rates of price appreciation were constant for each housing type in the distribution
metropolitan area, but varied among housing types, the price index Since the pr
would only be related to the distribution of housing across towns, or analysis is caile
at least, the distribution of repeat sales.) price of sitesi
Insummary, the estimated demand equation relates changes in housing when
proportions of income classes in each zone to a somewhat ad hoc set measures neith
of measures of changes in zonal characteristics and price, and analysis also
practically ignores changes in housing characteristics.' expectation."
The strategy behind the supply analysis, in contrast, comes from
column B. The authors present several equations relating changes in NOTES TO COl housing accommodations in each zone to vacancy rates, their
changes, the preexisting stock, and available vacant land, but other-
1. wise the locational and demographic characteristics of the towns,
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whichare so important in the demand analysis, are virtually ignored.
The same ambiguous price variable is used to investigate the supply
response, and itis noted that "the price variable has a critical
importance in leading the market's adjustment process out of
disequilibrium "2
Notethat the demand analysis measures the demand for location,
with little effort to "hold constant" the spatial distribution of
residential capital, with no effort to "hold constant" the locational
differences among zones. Is the price term to be interpreted as a
capitalized location rent (in the demand equation) or is it interpreted
as the output price of housing (in the supply equation)? If so, what is
the slope of the supply curve? What is the anticipated behavior of
demanders for owner-occupied units, who are 54 percent of the
Boston housing market?
This is, of course, an empirical question, and the proof of an
econometric analysis is in the estimates. There are rigorous statistical
standards, and there are looser interpretations of patterns or coeffi-
cients—their signs, magnitudes, and significancelevels.I would
submit, however, that it takes unusually strong and sometimes
puzzling a priori notions to analyze the results displayed in this study
and conclude that the "results display encouraging consistency with
theoretical expectation for both demand and supply." When the
authors examine the price variable in the demand equations, they
conclude it is "one of the economically most significant variables."
When others look at the price coefficients they may see t ratios of
1.40, 0.76, and 0.33.
In the supply equations, the effect of higher prices is to stimulate
conversions of existing dwelling units from higher density to lower
density structure types. Higher prices do stimulate new-construction
activity in the aggregate, but are not considered to influence its
distribution among structure types.
Since the price term used throughout the supply and demand
analysis is called upon to perform two functions—to measure the
price of sites when housing is not distinguished and the price of
housing when sitesare not distinguished—it ispossible that it
measures neither very adequately. The results of the empirical
analysis also "display encouraging consistency with [this] theoretical
expectation."
NOTESTO COMMENTS ON CHAPTER THREE
1.Itis difficult to understand the reasoniilg which leads to the regression
model with an eridogenous price change and an exogenous tax change. Why are92 Residential Location and Housing Choice
1960values used for the vacancy rate, the proportion of "old" houses, and the
proportion black, and 1960-1970 relative changes used for the other variables
reported in Table 3-1. What is even more curious is that the latter two variables
are measured as 1960 levels in this version of the study and were measured as
1960-1970 relative changes in the original version.
2. Why was the price term included in the regression for estimating the
distribution of new units across towns and excluded from the regressions for
: Mea
estimatingthe distribution of new single-family and apartment units? Intt
Itis even more difficult to understand why the analysts chose such a
peculiar functional form for estimating the latter regression, in effect including a
vector of zeros as observations on all variables in towns where apartments are
banned.
Finally, there is no obvious reason why the dependent variables in the
new-construction regressions should be measured as ratios to the number of
existing dwelling units in 1960 while the dependent variables in the conversion
regressions should be measured as ratios to the land area of the town.